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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks to reverse the District Court's
denial of Appellant's Motion to Alter Judgment denying her
Petition for Writ of Mandamus.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
After a hearing on April 21, 1977, in the Small
Claims Court of Murray City, Respondent in this case, a j ud1
rnent was entered in the matter of State of Utah v. Rose Mar.
Hurne against Appellant.

Appellant's counsel, who appeared

at the hearing, first learned of the adverse judgment from
the plaintiff in that matter on July 1, 1977.

Appellant ha1

never received notice of the judgment from Respondent.

On

the next working day, Appellant's counsel mailed Appellant'
Notice of Appeal from the judgment to Respondent.

The Noti

of Appeal was filed in Respondent Court on July 7, 1977.
Respondent court refused, however, to forward the Notice of
Appeal to the District Court, stating that it was untimely,
and claiming to have sent notice of entry of judgment to
Appellant on May 2, 1977.

Appellant petitioned the Distric

Court for a Writ of Mandamus to compel Respondent to forwar
the Notice of Appeal.

This Petition was denied.

Appellant

then made a timely Motion to Alter Judgment, under Rule 591
U.R.C.P., on the grounds that, as a matter of law, insuffi·
cient evidence was presented at the hearing on the Petitior
to justify a decision that Respondent sent Appellant noticf
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of entry of judgment.

That Motion also was denied, on the

grounds that it was improper procedure.
QUESTIONS TO BE DECIDED
1.

Was the Rule 59(e) Motion to Alter Judgment

a proper procedure to employ?
2.

Does Appellant have a constitutional right to

notice of entry of judgment from Small Claims Court?
3.

Does Appellant have a statutory right to notice

of entry of judgment from Small Claims court?
4.

Was there insufficient evidence as a matter

of law to establish that Respondent sent Appellant notice of
entry of judgment?
ARGUMENT
I

APPELLANT'S MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT UNDER
59(e) WAS THE PROPER PROCEDURE TO EMPLOY.
Rule 59(e), U.R.C.P., provides:

RUL~

"A motion to alter

or amend the judgment shall be served not later than 10 days
after entry of the judgment."

A motion under this rule is

the proper procedure to use to seek to vacate a judgment.
Nichols v. State, 554 P.2d 231 (Utah 1976).

In finding the

motion in Nichols untimely, this court stated, "After an order
of dismissal, the plaintiff must move under Rules 59(e) or
60(b) to reopen the judgment."

554 P.2d at 232.

U.R.C.P. Rule 59 (e) is identical to Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure Rule 59(e).

Federal cases under that rule

are instructive as to the proper use of a motion to alter
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judgment.

In American Family Life Assurance Co. v. Planned

Marketing Assoc., Inc., 389 F. Supp. 1141 (E.D. Va. 1974),
the court had dismissed the complaint for lack of jurisdict
The plaintiff filed a Rule 59(e) motion requesting the com
to vacate its order on the grounds that the dismissal was
"contrary to law."

In response to this motion, the court

stated:
Defendants point out that plaintiff's motion
to vacate and set aside the court's previous
order is, in reality, merely an appeal from
that order. Defendants concede, however,
that Rule 59(e) is available to a movant who
seeks to have an order vacated.
11 Wright &
Miller Fed. Practice & Procedure, §2804 (1973);
6A Moore, Fed. Practice, para. 59,12[1] (1974).
389 F. Supp. at 1144.
The court, holding the motion proper, proceeded to conside1
it on its merits.
Here, as in American Family Life, Appellant move(
the District court under Rule 59 (e) to alter judgment on t!
grounds the court's judgment was contrary to law.

In hold:

the procedure improper, the District Court erred in its
interpretation of Rule 59(e).

Appellant's Motion

should~

considered on its merits.
Spatz v. Mascone, 368 F. Supp. 352 (W.D. Pa. 197
explained the origins and breadth of Rule 59(e).

There,

plaintiff moved the court under Rule 59 (e) to vacate its o
granting defendant's motion for summary judgment.

In hold

that the plaintiff's motion was proper, the court quoted a
length from Gainey v. Brotherhood of Ry. and Steamship C};;
303 F.2d 716, 718 (3d Cir. 1962):
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Rule 59 has been properly described as 'an
amalgamation of the motion for new trial at
common law and the petition for rehearing in
equity adapted to the unified procedure ..• '
6 Moore, Federal Practice (2d ed. 1953) para.
59.02, at 3707. Of course, technically there
is no trial when summary judgment is granted.
But even before Rule 59 was amended in 1946
to add subsection Ce}, specifically providing
for motions to alter or amend a judgment, the
original provision of the Rule authorizing a
party to move for a new trial within ten days
after judgment was construed by several courts
as broad enough to include motions for reconsideration of orders finally disposing of action
before trial.
{Citations omitted.]
Since the
addition of subsection (e) the courts which have
considered the problem seem to have experienced
no d~fficulty in concluding that a motion for
rehearing or reconsideration, made within ten
days after the entry of an appealable order
is within the coverage of Rule 59.
368 F. Supp.
at 353.
(Emphasis added.)
Appellant's Motion, essentially a motion for reconsideration, timely made, is within the coverage of Rule 59(e),
was proper, and therefore should be con?idered on its merits.
II

APPELLANT'S MOTION TO ALTER JUDGMENT SHOULD
BE GRANTED.
A.

PETITIONER HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT
TO APPEAL THE JUDGMENT OF THE SMALL
CLAIMS COURT AND THUS HAS A CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO NOTICE OF ENTRY OF
JUDGMENT, WHICH SHE WAS DENIED.

Article VIII, Section 9 of the Utah Constitution
provides in relevant part:

"Appeals shall also lie from the

final judgment of justices'of the peace in civil and criminal
cases to the District Courts on both questions of law and
fact, and with such limitations and restrictions as shall be
provided by law."

As held in Salt Lake City, v. Peters, 22 Utah

2d 127, 449 P.2d 652

(1969), this constitutional right to
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appeal extends to appeals from city courts as well as from
justices of the peace.
Under U.C.A. §78-6-1, small claims courts are a
department of city courts and justice courts.

Therefore th1

right to appeal city and justice courts' decisions under th1
Utah Constitution extends also to small claims courts.
ap~

Since Appellant has a constitutional right to
the decision of the small claims court, she also has the

right, under the Due Process Clauses of the Utah and United
States Constitutions, to notice of her right to appeal.

As

stated in Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust co., 339
U.S. 306, 314 (1950):
"The fundamental requisite of due process of
law is the opportunity to be heard." Grannis
v. Ordean, 234 U.S. 385, 394. This right to
be heard has little reality or worth unless
one is informed that the matter is pending and
can choose for himself whether to appear or
default, acquiesce or contest.
In the present case, Appellant was not informed t

As

judgment was entered in Respondent Small Claims court.

will be explained more fully below, under U.C.A. §78-6-10,
a dissatisfied defendant in small claims court has five

d~

from notice of entry of judgment to appeal to the district
court.

Since Appellant had no notice of the entry of judg·

ment in the Small Claims Court, she was not informed when
the appeal period began.
unable to file an appeal.

Lacking this information, she

wa~

Because the lack of notice deni'

Appellant her constitutional right to appeal, she was
her constitutional right to due process.
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den~

B.

PETITIONER HAS A STATUTORY RIGHT TO
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT IN SMALL
CLAIMS COURT UNDER u.c.A. §§78-6-10
AND 78-6-11 AND RULE 73 (_h), WHICH SHE
WAS DENIED.

U.C.A. §78-6-10, referring to small claims courts,
provides:
The judgment of said court shall be conclusive
upon the plaintiff unless a counterclaim has
been interposed.
If the defendant is dissatisfied, he may, within five days from the entry
of said judgment against him, appeal to the
district court of the county in which said court
is held ••..
This section does not mention the right to notice of the
entry of judgment.

Nevertheless, U.C.A. §78-6-11, U.R.C.P.

Rule 73(h), and Utah case law make it clear that §78-6-10
contemplates the defendant's receiving notice of entry of
judgment to mark the beginning of the appeal period.
U.C.A. §78-6-11, referring to small claims courts,
provides, "The appeal shall be in the same manner as appeals
generally from a city or justice court."

U.R.C.P. Rule 73(h)

provides:
An appeal may be taken to the district court

from a final judgment rendered in a city or
justice court within one month after notice
of the entry of such judgment, or within
such shorter time as may be provided by law •...
(_Emphasis added.)
When these two provisions are read together, two points emerge.
(1)

Appeals from small claims courts are governed by the five-

day period.

This period is consistent with the legislature's

power under Rule 73(h) to provide for a shorter appeal period
than thirty days from city or justice court, of which small
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claims court is a department under §78-6-1.

(2 }

The appeal

period from small claims court commences upon notice of entr
of judgment to the defendant.
clear, since (a}

This notice requirement is

appeal from small claims court is taken

u

the same manner as appeals generally from city or justice
court, and (bl

the appeal period from city or justice cour:

of which small claims court is a department, begins upon
notice of entry of judgment.
If a dissatisfied defendant in small claims court
such as Appellant, receives no notice of entry of judgment,
there can be no time limit for the filing of appeal, since
the appeal period cannot start without that notice.

There·

fore, Appellant's appeal should not be time-barred, since
the statutory period for filing had not been started by
Respondent giving Appellant notice of entry of an adverse
judgment in Respondent court.
Utah case law under current and former statutes
supports this interpretation of the notice requirement.

Tl

most recent case, Larson Ford Sales, Inc. v. Silver, 551 p,
233 (Utah 1976), upheld §78-6-10 against an equal protecti1
challenge, made on the basis that an appellant from small
claims court has only five days to appeal, rather than one
month as from city and justice court.

Implicit in that ca

is that notice of the entry of judgment is required to beg
the appeal period from small claims court.

This Court sta

" [A] s an appellant from the small claims court he is allo~
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only five days within which to file his notice of appeal,
whereas appeals from city and district court judgments may
be made within one month."

551 P.2d at 233.

This court

recognized the distinction between appeals from city and
from small claims courts as between the time periods only
and not in the right to notice of entry of judgment to start
the appeal period.
Forsythe v. Third Judicial Dist. Ct., 41 Utah 16,
123 P.621, 623 (1912), decided under Comp. Laws of 1907,
§3744, a predecessor of Rule 73(h), explained the purpose
of the notice requirement:
Its purpose manifestly is to apprise the
losing party of the time the judgment was
entered against him in the action, so as to
give him ample opportunity to take an appeal
to the district court .... The primary object of the service of the notice, therefore,
is to set in motion the 30-day period within
which an appeal must be taken, and to leave
no room for doubt that the losing party has
had notice of when that period begins and ends.
It is inconceivable that the Utah Legislature would retain
the notice requirement for appellants from city and justice
courts, yet abandon the fair-minded purposes behind the notice
requirement for the less advantaged appellants from small
claims court, who have a much shorter appeal period.
Further, a denial of right to notice of entry of
judgment would clearly be a denial of equal protection, as
well as a denial of due process as explained supra.

Although

the shorter appeal period has been held not a denial of equal
protection in Larson Ford Sales, Inc. v. Silver, supra, that
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case did not address the issue of whether small claims cou1
appellants could be denied notice of entry of judgment con·
sistent with the Equal Protection Clause.

It may be reasor

able, considering the nature and purpose of small claims
court, to provide a shorter appeal period; nothing in the
nature and purpose of small claims court, however, justifi1
denying appellants the opportunity to know when the appeal
period begins and ends and thus the opportunity to file
timely appeals from adverse judgments.
The appeal period dates from the notice of entry
judgment.
cannot run.

In the absence of this notice, the appeal perio1
Therefore, in the circumstances of this case,

the appeal cannot be time-barred.

Here, the judgment was

entered against Appellant in Respondent Court on May 2, 19
Appellant was not given notice of the entry of judgment pr
to July 1, 1977, when Appellant's counsel received notice
from the other party to the judgment, the plaintiff in
of Utah v. Rose Marie Hume.

§.!!

On the next working day Appel

lant's counsel mailed the Notice of Appeal, which was file
in Respondent Court on July 7, 1977.

Appellant thus compl

with the app~al .procedure as rapidly as possible in the cl
cumstances.

In similar circumstances, this court has held

an appeal not time-barred.

In Bullen v. Anderson, 81 Utah

151, 17 P.2d 213, 215 (1932), decided under an earlier
statute allowing filing of the notice of appeal within
thirty days of notice of entry of judgment, this Court hel
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[T]he time for taking an appeal dated from
notice of the entry of judgment, not from the
date of the entry of the judgment ..••
In the
absence of notice of the entry of judgment, an
appeal taken more than six months after its
entry is in due time notwithstanding the judgment debtor may have had actual knowledge of
its entry.
Under Bullen, Appellant's appeal was filed in due time.

There-

fore, that appeal should be heard.
C.

THERE WAS INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE AS A
MATTER OF LAW TO ESTABLISH THAT RESPONDENT
SENT APPELLANT NOTICE OF ENTRY OF JUDGMENT.

At the hearing in the District Court on Appellant's
Petition for a Writ of Mandamus to compel Respondent to forward the Notice of Appeal, Respondent produced a copy of a
letter that it claimed it had mailed to Appellant giving
notice of entry of judgment.

This evidence is insufficient

as a matter of law to justify a decision that Respondent sent
or Appellant received notice of the entry of judgment.
1.

TO RAISE A PRESUMPTION IN FACT OF
RECEIPT OF A LETTER, THERE MUST BE
PROOF OF MAILING THE LETTER PROPERLY
ADDRESSED WITH POSTAGE PREPAID.

When a party attempts to prove that another person
received a letter in the mail, courts engage in a presumption
of fact that if the letter is proved to be properly addressed
and mailed, the letter was received by the addressee.

That

is the rule in Utah, as stated by this Court in Campbell

v.

Gowans, 35 Utah 268, 100 P.397 (1909), and Brown v. Fraternal
Accident Ass'n of America, 18 Utah 265, 55 P.63 (1898).
is important to keep in mind that proof of mailing is an
-10Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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It

antecedent to application of the presumption.

As stated

in Suits v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America
139 Minn. 246, 166 N.W. 222, 223 (1918), "The presumption
that a properly mailed letter will reach the person to whom
addressed has application only when the act of mailing is
unquestioned or conclusively established."

(Emphasis added

In Suits, the court affirmed the trial court's finding of
non-receipt, holding that proof of mailing was not conclusi
despite (1)

subsequent action by the alleged addressee

consistent with receipt of the letter;

(2)

a stipulation c

facts by the parties that a witness would testify to the
preparation of the letter, enclosure in a properly addresse
envelope, including postage and return address, non-return
of the letter, and while no particular recollection of mail
the letter, belief of mailing from habit and custom;

(3) a

further stipulation that the person who allegedly mailed tl
letter was methodical; and (4)

the fact that after the ser

death, the letter was not found among his papers.
2.

MERE PROOF OF WRITING A LETTER DOES
NOT RAISE AN INFERENCE OF MAILING SO
AS TO RAISE THE PRESUMPTION OF RECEIPT

In the present case, the only evidence that the
notice of Respondent's judgment was sent to Appellant was
a copy of the letter claimed to have been mailed.

Such a

showing is insufficient to raise an inference of mailing s·
as to raise the presumption of receipt.

In Jacobs v. Nati·

Accident and Health Insurance Company, 103 Vt. 5, 151 A. 5
566 (1930), the court stated:
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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All that appears is that such a letter
is written.
It is not shown that it ever
found its way into the mails.
It is to be
remembered that it is the mailing of a
letter that raises the so-called presumption that it was ever received by the addressee •••. But it would be going too far,
we think to say that evidence that a letter
was "written" implies that it was deposited
in the post office, properly stamped and
addressed.
It was held in Uhlman v. A & 5
Brewing Co. (C.C.) 53 F. 485, that the
mailing of a letter will not be presumed
from the fact that it was written. To the
same effect are National Building Association v. Quin, 120 Ga. 358, 47 S.E. 962;
Best v. German Ins. Co., 68 Mo. App. 598;
Bankers' Mutual Cas. Co. v. People's Bank,
127 Ga. 326, 56 S.E. 429; and Sills v. Burge,
141 Mo. App. 148, 124 S.W. 605.
To the same effect is James E. Cashman v. Spellman,
233 App. Div. 45, 48, 251 N.Y.S. 240 (1931), which also held
it error for the trial court to have admitted a copy of a
letter in evidence without proof of mailing, which allegedly
occurred "in the ordinary course of business."
On these grounds, in the present case no inference
of mailing of the notice of the judgment should have arisen,
and therefore Respondent could not avail itself of the presumption of receipt, which only flows from proof of the
proper mailing.
3.

THE PRESUMPTION OF RECEIPT THAT ARISES
FROM PROOF OF PROPER MAILING IS A
REBUTTABLE PRESUMPTION OF FACT, AND
DENIAL OF RECEIPT CREATES A CONFLICT IN
THE EVIDENCE TO BE RESOLVED BY THE TRIER
OF FACT.

Brown v. Fraternal Accident Ass'n of America, supra,
66, established the rule in Utah that "the presumption of fact
raised by the proof that the notice was sent by mail was a
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
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circumstance, when opposed by a denial of the receipt of ti
letter, to be weighed by the jury with all the other evidet
in determining the question whether or not the letter was
actually received.u
rebut table.

That is, the presumption of fact is

In Campbell, supra, the presumption was in fac

successfully rebutted by denial of receipt, coupled with
action inconsistent with receipt.

The fact situation in

Suits, supra, is also relevant, since the court upheld a
finding of non-receipt there in the face of a much stronge:
showing of mailing than was made by Respondent in the pres1
case.
4.

THE PARTY ASSERTING RECEIPT OF A
LETTER HAS THE BURDEN OF PROVING
ITS RECEIPT.

·In Huntley v. Whittier, 105 Mass. 391, 392-93
7 Am. Rep. 536,

(1870), the court stated,

"the burden of

proving its receipt remains throughout upon the party who
asserts it."

This rule accords with the basic rule of fE

ness in the law of evidence that a party should not be for
to prove a negative, e.g., that a letter was not mailed or
received.

As the court stated in Palicka v. Ruth Fisher

School Dist. No. 90 of Maricopa county, 13 Ariz. App. 5,
473 P.2d 807, 811 (1970), "It is the

genera~

rule that

t~

party asserting the affirmative of an issue has the burder
of proving it."

To the same effect are Firkins v. Affolt1

504 P.2d 365 (Colo. App. 1972); and Carter v. Burn constr
Co., Inc., 85 N.M. 27, 508 P.2d 1324 (1973).

This rule

is especially salutary in a case such as the present, whe
the party asserting the affirmative had physical control
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the subject matter and thus personal knowledge available as
to the handling of the letter.
Since in the present case Respondent has not presented competent evidence to uphold its burden, Appellant
should be found not to have received notice of the judgment
more than five days before filing her Notice of Appeal.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the District Court
to issue a Writ of Mandamus to compel Respondent to forward
Appellant's Notice of Appeal to the District Court.
CONCLUSION
Respondent has produced insufficient evidence as
a matter of law to support a finding that Respondent sent
or Appellant received notice of entry of judgment.

Under

the Utah constitution Appellant has a right to notice of
entry of judgment.

Appellant also has a statutory right to

notice of entry of judgment.

Therefore the District Court's

denial of a Writ of Mandamus to compel Respondent to forward
the Notice of Appeal was improper.

Further, the denial of

Appellant's Motion to Alter the Judgment denying the Writ,
on the basis that that Motion was improper procedure, was an
error of law.
Wherefore, Appellant prays that this court:
1.

Enter its Judgment that Appellant's Motion to

Alter Judgment was proper procedure and that the evidence .to
support a finding that Respondent sent, or Appellant received,

-14-
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not~ce

of entry of judgment was insufficient as a matter

of law.
2.

Reverse the District Court's denial of Appel

lant's Motion and order the District Court to issue a Writ
of Mandamus to compel Respondent to forward Appellant's
Notice of Appeal.
DATED this ~ day of
UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.

By Lucy Billings
Attorney for Appellant

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I DO HEREBY CERTIFY that I mailed a true and

cor~

copy of the foregoing Appellant's Brief to H. Craig Hall, I
Attorney for Respondent, 5461 South State Street, Murray,
Utah 84107.
DATED this

--1.£.!:_

day of -....l.Ar-'1'-'----1_ _ _ _ _ _ , 191
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